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Population projections are an important point of connection between de-
mographers’ expert knowledge, policymakers’ applied knowledge, and the 
public’s popular knowledge. They can influence family policy and migration 
policy, in addition to population policy, and are used for economic planning. 
They can also serve as potent symbols in public debates, providing concrete 
representations of the long-term effects of complex processes. For example, 
projections of the global population and the populations of poorer countries 
were often cited in warnings of the dangers of the “population bomb” in the 
1960s and 1970s. Earlier, in the period between the two world wars, popula-
tion projections featured prominently in public discussions of concern over 
declining birthrates in France and Great Britain: projections of steep popula-
tion declines were cited repeatedly in political and media discussions of the 
time (Soloway 1990: 232–46; Winter 1990: 445–48; Spengler 1938: 63–64).1
Because population projections require the experts who make them to 
quantify their assumptions about an uncertain future, they provide insight 
into often-unstated subjective beliefs underlying quantitative analyses of de-
mographic processes.2 As the authors of official French national projections 
argued, projections require “knowing how to read the past” (Calot et al. 1970: 
7). But the makers of projections do not read the past by mechanistically 
applying standardized procedures; the assumptions required to produce pro-
jections necessarily entail subjective judgments about future trends. Despite 
the fact that demographers often emphasize that their projections should be 
interpreted as hypothetical—mere demonstrations of what would occur if the 
given assumptions held—they know that projections are often interpreted as 
forecasts, seen as presenting the outcome that the authors think is most likely 
to occur (Keyfitz 1987: 241–3).3 Furthermore, even hypothetical scenarios 
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require judgments that some futures are more likely than others. Since it 
is impossible to produce projections for every possible future scenario, the 
makers of projections, by including certain sets of assumptions rather than 
others, define a set of future trends that they believe are more likely than 
other possible trends. Since projections require their makers to formalize their 
subjective judgments, they provide evidence of these subjective judgments—a 
valuable resource for social scientists interested in observing them. Studying 
the assumptions used to produce projections thus provides scholars of the pro-
duction of demographic knowledge with a unique opportunity to investigate 
how subjective beliefs influence the science of demography. 
French and British views of fertility in  
the postwar twentieth century
The cases of France and Great Britain4 in the postwar twentieth century 
(the 1950s through the 1990s) were chosen for this comparative case study 
because policymakers and publics in these two countries viewed national 
fertility rates very differently during this period. Among Western European 
nations, France was an outlier in discourse and policy for much of this period, 
both by virtue of the near-consensus across the French political spectrum that 
concern over birthrates was warranted, and through the consistent provision 
of initiatives thought to encourage childbearing (Gauthier 1996: 137). In 
contrast, Great Britain remained at the other end of the spectrum throughout 
the postwar twentieth century, distinguishing itself with an almost complete 
absence of explicit state and public attention to below-replacement fertility or 
population policy: the British government’s approach to population policy has 
been characterized as “no problem—no intervention” (Gauthier 1996: 141).
These differences would not be so puzzling if French birthrates had been 
significantly lower than British birthrates during this period. However, the 
two countries’ period total fertility rates were strikingly similar throughout 
the period in question (Figure 1).5 When they differed, it was nearly always 
French birthrates that were higher. 
To address the question of how such similar trends in postwar birthrates 
in these two countries came to be interpreted very differently, I focus on the 
construction of demographic knowledge through population projections. By 
the end of World War I, knowledge and beliefs about population were filtered 
through the disciplinary expertise of demographers and transmitted to wider 
audiences through population projections, among other mechanisms. Ex-
amining projections themselves and how they were made sheds light on the 
production of a consequential form of demographic knowledge, contributing 
to a better understanding of how concerns over low fertility were maintained 
in France, but not in Great Britain, over a long period of similar birthrates in 
the two countries.
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Population projections as quantification 
Most studies of European population projections have focused on the meth-
ods used for projection and the accuracy of projections (e.g., Hajnal 1955; 
Brass 1974; Shaw 1994, 2007; Keilman 1997, 2007; Keilman and Pham 
2004). In addition, a smaller body of work has examined the historical devel-
opment of European methods for population projections, exploring the social 
context and meaning of projections before World War II (e.g., Gans 1999; 
Fleishhacker, Gans, and Burch 2003). This study builds on the latter work, 
focusing on the contexts in which projections have been made since World 
War II, as well as their meaning as representations of possible demographic 
futures. In this study the methods and assumptions used to make projections 
are primarily considered not as sources of error, but as reflections of the as-
sumptions (explicit or implicit) about population trends held by the parties 
making the projections. 
Projections are also treated here as representations that can influence 
thinking and public discussion about population. This approach to projec-
tions is informed by a broader literature on quantification, which examines 
the process of creating numerical representations and the effects of this pro-
cess (Espeland and Stevens 2008; Starr 1987). One central argument of this 
literature is that “measurement intervenes in the social worlds it depicts” 
(Espeland and Stevens 2008: 412). Theories of quantification, like theories 
of performativity (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2008), emphasize that the 
creation of a representation, in and of itself, can have tangible effects on 
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FIGURE 1   Period total fertility rate, England and France, 1946–2000
SOURCES: UK Office of National Statistics (ONS 2011); Institut national de la statistique et des études
économiques (INSEE 2014a).
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the phenomenon it represents. In the case of population, academics and 
practitioners alike have recognized this possibility. Scholars have warned 
of the dangers of reification in academic demography, whereby “through 
repeated use, some indices become so familiar that their somewhat arbitrary 
nature is forgotten” (Wilson and Oeppen 2003: 121). In a more applied set-
ting, the introduction to the 1975 British national projections notes that, 
“in some circumstances the publication of a projection can itself influence 
future events … so as to invalidate the assumptions on which the projec-
tion was based” (OPCS 1977: 2). This study considers national population 
projections an important example of quantification of expectations about 
the demographic future, as projections became part of national discussions 
about population and policy. 
Analytic approach
This study has two main goals. The first is to compare the projections pro-
duced in France and Great Britain and to examine the nature and meaning of 
cross-national differences in projections, particularly differences in the fertility 
assumptions used to make projections. The second goal is to examine possible 
sources of differences in projections. I identify two key factors: different de-
mographic histories in France and Great Britain and the distinct institutional 
configurations that affected who made projections in each country. I also 
consider the relationships between these factors, particularly the influence 
of demographic history on institutional structures. 
To begin, an analysis of six sets of population projections from each 
country, covering a fifty-year period, examines how the methods used to 
make official national projections, and the projections themselves, differed 
in these two countries. The same method of projection was generally used 
in both countries, but a difference is observed in how it was used: multiple-
variant projections were published in France, while single-variant projections 
were published in Britain. This difference is shown to have important implica-
tions for how the projections can be interpreted, with the publication of mul-
tiple variants highlighting future contingency, while the publication of a single 
variant presents an image of certainty. Next, assumptions about the future 
trend of fertility used to make these projections are examined.6 Comparisons 
show that although recent trends were similar, British and French fertility 
assumptions were quite different for much of the study period, with British 
projections generally assuming higher future fertility than French projections. 
Despite the use of similar techniques of demographic analysis, different 
fertility assumptions resulted in quantitatively different projections in each 
country. National projections are thus shown to have provided representations 
of distinct demographic futures in each country: a reassuring depiction of slow 
growth in Britain, and a picture of contingency in France that included the pos-
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sibility of population decline. These analyses show how projections contributed 
to differences in understandings of the meaning of population trends. 
To explore mechanisms that may have contributed to the observed dif-
ferences in projections, I then use primary and secondary historical sources 
to examine the demographic histories and institutional configurations of the 
two countries. I argue that the two countries’ different histories of popula-
tion change that date back to at least the nineteenth century, particularly 
longstanding French concerns about low fertility and population decline, led 
to different postwar institutional configurations that gave French academic 
demographers much greater influence than their British counterparts. French 
projections were produced by demographers, while British projections were 
produced by actuaries with different disciplinary dispositions, and these intel-
lectual and institutional differences had implications for the projections that 
were produced. 
Methodological approaches to  
population projections
The first analysis is a comparison of the methods used to produce official na-
tional population projections in the two countries. Although the basic method 
used was quite similar for most of this period, as both the French and British 
projections used the cohort component method (with the exception of the 
early British projections), two differences in the ways that projections were 
made and presented had important consequences for their interpretation: 
the number of variants published in a projection and the assumptions made 
about future fertility levels. 
Projections provide estimates for the possible future size of a population 
by taking the current population size as the starting point, then applying as-
sumptions about population change over time to this starting population. The 
cohort component method, first developed at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, became the dominant method of projection during the interwar period 
and has remained nearly unchallenged since (Fleishhacker, Gans, and Burch 
2003). The method explicitly models the three processes by which population 
size can change: births, deaths, and migration. Thus the population at some 
time in the future can be thought of as the sum of the current population size 
plus the number of births, minus the number of deaths, plus the net number 
of migrants, which may be either positive or negative. In this method, the 
population is divided into age groups, and each group is treated as progress-
ing through life in stages, experiencing a given set of mortality and fertility 
rates (usually assumed to vary with age) throughout its members’ lifetimes. 
These calculations require detailed assumptions about age-specific fertility 
and mortality, as well as assumptions about the age structure of the starting 
population and the migrant population, if they are not known. 
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Data
In the following analyses I use French projections published by the National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and British projections 
prepared by the General Register Office (GRO) and the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) of the United Kingdom. While the British 
projections were at first produced every year, and later every other year, 
the French projections are usually produced either five or ten years apart. 
Projections for the two countries are compared for all existing French official 
projections from this period except one.7 The British projections used for 
comparison are from the same year as the French whenever possible; of the 
six observations examined, there are two cases in which other nearby years 
must be used. The time points covered by this analysis are thus 1950–55, 
1963, 1970, 1975, 1985, and 1989–91.
The main data source for Great Britain is the population projections 
made by the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD), which produced 
the national projections from 1954 to 2006 (they are now produced by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS)). Starting with the 1971 projections, a 
GAD database (available from the GAD on request) contains complete in-
formation on the projected numbers of births, deaths, and migrants used to 
project total population size, along with the total fertility rate (TFR) implied 
by the projections. For years before 1971, only total population projections 
are provided in the database. For these years, less complete information on 
the projected number of births and deaths used to calculate projected total 
population is published in the Registrar General’s Quarterly Return for England 
and Wales and the annual Registrar General’s Statistical Review of England and 
Wales. Mid-year population estimates for England and Wales in electronic 
form were requested from the ONS and supplemented with published figures 
in the Registrar General’s Statistical Review of England and Wales. Vital statistics re-
cords including the yearly total fertility rates recorded in England and Wales, 
which I use to analyze the error rate in projections, are available online (ONS 
2011). Separate projections were calculated for the separate regions of Great 
Britain. The analyses presented here are of the projections for England and 
Wales; projections that combined other regions of Great Britain were similar. 
Data for the French projections, produced every five to ten years, are 
found in selected volumes in the series Les Collections de l’INSEE. A complete 
list of the volumes used is given in the source note to Table 1. They contain 
total population projections and the assumptions for fertility, mortality, and 
migration used to make the projections. For the first time period, the French 
data are taken from a 1953 article published in the French journal Popula-
tion, which compares population projections for several European countries 
(Bourgeois-Pichat 1953). Data on actual population size and fertility rates for 
France were obtained from INSEE’s online database (INSEE 2014a, 2014b). 
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Single versus multiple variants and the 
meaning of projections
There is a clear difference between the two countries in their use of variants 
in population projections. In Great Britain until the mid-1970s, only a single 
variant was published in each yearly projection. One hypothesis for the course 
of future mortality, one hypothesis for the course of future fertility, and one 
hypothesis for the course of future migration were selected and then applied 
to the current population estimate to produce a single projection of the total 
future population. Even when variations on these hypotheses began to be 
calculated, they were published separately at first (e.g., OPCS 1974) and were 
then confined to the final chapter of the publication, separate from the main 
results. An introduction to British projections that include variants even pro-
vides a caution that “these additional projections are not put forward with the 
intention that users should select the projection which conforms most closely 
to their own beliefs about the future; the principal projection should remain 
the focus of consideration for planning purposes, with the variants providing 
some measure of the uncertainties present” (OPCS 1987: 21).
In contrast, French projections were always published as a set of multiple 
variants, constructed from multiple hypotheses. Hypotheses about migration 
and mortality sometimes varied, but the greatest number of variants resulted 
from the use of multiple fertility hypotheses (Table 1). (The 1953 projection 
had too many variants to include in the table, but its central variant will be 
used in further analyses.) Notably, in many of the French projections, no 
central projection existed. Rather, there were a “low variant” and a “high vari-
ant,” based on low or high fertility assumptions. As a result, the contingency 
of these population projections is inescapable: a reader who wished to make 
TABLE 1 Variants of French population projections published 1963–1990
 Fertility variants
 Total    Very Very  Other 
Year variants High Low Central high low Migration variants
1963 6      No With constant 
        mortality
1968 2      No
1970 4      As a variant 
       (through 1986)
1975 4      No
1985 6      Until 2000 With lower
        mortality
1990 5      As a variant  Constant
       (+50,000/year) mortality
SOURCES: Febvay et al. 1964; Calot et al. 1970; Hémery et al. 1973; Dinh and Labat 1979, 1986; Dinh 1995.
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use of these projections could not simply choose to use the central variant, 
ignoring other possibilities, but must consider how to handle the multiple 
variants provided. Unlike the British producers of projections, who admon-
ished their users to focus on the central (or principal) variant, the French 
producers of projections with no central variant demanded consideration of 
multiple possible futures for the French population. 
The reasons for this difference in the British and French approaches 
to variants are not directly stated in the explanations accompanying the 
projections. The British explanations express concern that the single variant 
may produce a false appearance of certainty, noting that the publication of a 
single variant “has led some commentators to conclude that the projection is 
a ‘forecast’ or ‘prediction.’” Nonetheless, they conclude with the authorita-
tively uninformative assertion that “it has been considered more suitable to 
produce a single ‘official’ set of projections for common use to provide con-
sistency between the many users of the projections” (OPCS 1977: 1). When 
the British projections include multiple variants at all, they are described as 
a way to address concerns about false appearances of certainty. By 1991, the 
title of the section on the projection variants was changed from “Variants” to 
“Uncertainty of Population Projections.” In that section, variants are described 
as one of “a number of possible ways of indicating the inherent uncertainty 
in making population projections” (OPCS 1993: 27). The British publications 
thus present variants of population projections as a way to represent uncer-
tainty around the central projection, rather than as alternate, equally valid 
possibilities for the future.
The French explanations for the choice to present multiple variants are 
similarly vague, although uncertainty also figures prominently in their ac-
counts. The published introduction to the 1968 French projections cites un-
certainty about the future trend of fertility, as a result of recent large changes 
in birthrates, as a justification for providing two sets of assumptions about 
future fertility—a high and a low variant (Calot et al. 1970: 13). The 1985 
projections note that “among the factors driving the future of the population, 
the most uncertain is fertility. Therefore, four hypotheses of the evolution of 
fertility are considered, in order to cover a large range of possibilities” (Dinh 
and Labat 1986: 9). The French approach to this uncertainty differs from the 
British approach, however, in that the French projections present multiple 
variants as distinct possible future trajectories, rather than as a background 
of uncertainty unfolding about a central projection, as in the British case.
These different approaches to variants of projections may reflect differ-
ent approaches to statistical representation of social phenomena in each coun-
try. Desrosières distinguishes “two tendencies in the use and interpretation of 
social statistics” (1998: 43). The first tendency, which Desrosières notes arises 
from a tradition following Quetelet and Durkheim (of Belgian and French 
nationality, respectively), conceives of statistics as representations of social 
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realities, while the second tendency, from a tradition following the British 
statisticians Galton and Pearson, embraces the constructed nature of statis-
tics. In this sense, multiple variants in the French projections could reflect 
dissatisfaction with single-variant projections as inadequate representations 
of possible future social realities.
Although the reasons for the use of single or multiple variants are diffi-
cult to identify definitively, the implications of this difference are clear. In the 
British case, as the authors of the projections acknowledge, the use of a single 
variant creates the impression of certainty about future population trends. 
The continued presentation of only a central variant in the main body of the 
British publications hides the contingency of the assumptions behind the 
projection, acting as a form of March and Simon’s “uncertainty absorption” 
that characterizes quantification processes in which “the premises behind the 
numbers disappear” (discussion of March and Simon 1958 in Espeland and 
Stevens 2008: 422). In the French case, in contrast, the inclusion of multiple 
variants highlights the contingency of population projections by making the 
consideration of other possibilities unavoidable: readers are shown graphs 
with multiple lines illustrating different possibilities for the future size of the 
population. Contingency is particularly emphasized in the majority of the 
French projections in which there is no central variant at all. When there is 
no single “most likely” central variant, but rather a high and a low variant, it 
is impossible to represent the projections accurately with a simplification to 
a single variant and hide the uncertainty around the projections. 
Another contingency highlighted by the multiple variants in the French 
projections is the uncertain course of migration, through the presentation 
of separate variants with and without migration in some years. In 1963 and 
1970, each of the main variants was shown both with and without migration.8 
This format highlights how much of the projected total population is attribut-
able to migration rather than to so-called “natural” increase (births and deaths 
among the native-born population), maintaining a distinction between new 
immigrants and their descendants and the rest of the population of France. 
Assumptions about future fertility
Another critically important choice made by the authors of population projec-
tions is the choice of assumptions about future fertility. Figure 2 shows the 
assumed fertility rates for England and France used to produce projections 
throughout the period for which complete information is available.9 The 
analysis starts in 1970 for France and 1971 for Britain, since British fertility 
assumptions in terms of TFR are not published for earlier years. For clarity, 
not every annual British projection is shown.
The most striking feature of the upper graph in Figure 2 is that the Brit-
ish assumptions uniformly predict that fertility will increase, regardless of 
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the trends in preceding years. At every time at which projections are made, 
the British projections assume that fertility rates will rise above their current 
level, often above the average of the most recent several years. Furthermore, 
at nearly every point in time, the British fertility assumptions show strong 
confidence that fertility rates will reach equilibrium near the replacement 
rate of 2.1 children per woman. As late as 1985, when the TFR had been be-
low replacement for over a decade, the British fertility assumption was that 
the TFR would return to, and remain at, a near-replacement level of 2.0.10 If 
higher fertility rates were considered desirable, this would indicate remark-
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FIGURE 2   Fertility assumptions for Britain and France,
projections published 1971–1991
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économiques (INSEE 2014a).
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able optimism. In any case, it seems to represent a strong belief, impervious to 
recent history, that the long-term trend of fertility would result in equilibrium 
at near-replacement levels. This belief appears to illustrate a culturally influ-
enced assumption held by the makers of the projections, since it is unaffected 
by the empirical evidence of the demographic trends of preceding years. 
Turning to the French assumptions in the lower graph in Figure 2, it 
is clear that the fertility assumptions used for the high variants are very 
similar to the British assumptions: here, too, fertility is expected to reach 
equilibrium at replacement level. However, each low variant represents 
the possibility that fertility rates could stay below replacement level over 
the long term. In the absence of migration, this would eventually result 
in population decline. In the French case, then, the high and low fertility 
assumptions illustrate two possible demographic futures: first, an opti-
mistic high variant represents the possibility of replacement-level fertility 
maintaining population size in the long run (without migration); second, 
a pessimistic low variant represents the possibility of below-replacement 
fertility leading to eventual population decline in the absence of migration. 
The French projections thus provide the public with a representation of the 
possibility of population decline, a possibility that is absent from all but the 
latest British projections of this period. In the context of public debates over 
state support for families or state population policy, the French projections’ 
presentation of multiple possible futures could be used as powerful support 
for the argument that the demographic future of France was facing diverging 
pathways, and that policy could determine which path would be taken. The 
British projections, in contrast, would offer no such opportunity to parties 
who might wish to make a similar argument for intervention. The causes 
contributing to this difference in fertility assumptions cannot be directly 
observed. As discussed earlier, the authors of the projections offered only 
vague justifications for their choice of fertility assumptions. 
How do French and British projections differ?
What kinds of differences in the French and British projections of total popu-
lation resulted from the differences in how projections were produced? To 
compare the projections of future populations produced in France and Great 
Britain, the following analyses use the rate of growth of the projected popu-
lations, comparing the error in the rate of growth for France and Britain that 
characterizes each set of comparable projections. Using the rate of growth 
rather than total population size to calculate error simplifies the comparison 
of projections for populations of different sizes (Grummer-Strawn and Espen-
shade 1991). The rate of growth for the projected total population for each 
year included in the projection was calculated, using the standard formula 
for the growth rate r (Equation 1): 
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t t
=
−
−
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 (1)
where P(t) is total population size at time t, t
0
 is the base year of the projec-
tion, and t
1
 is the year for which the total population size is being projected. 
The results of these calculations are shown in the figures in the Appendix. 
They indicate that most variants project futures characterized by population 
growth, since the projected growth rates are above zero. After 1970, however, 
the French projections all include a low variant that shows an end to popula-
tion growth, with the growth rate declining to zero or below. This inclusion 
in the French projections of an expectation of an end to growth within the 
foreseeable (or at least projectable) future is an important difference between 
the French and British projections. Notably, even in the 1991 British projec-
tion showing a declining growth rate, the rate stays positive throughout the 
period covered by the projections. 
The figures in the Appendix also show that French projected growth 
rates were generally higher than British projected growth rates, but that the 
actual growth of the French population was also higher than that of Britain. 
To clarify this relationship, Figure 3 shows the error in the projected rate of 
growth (the difference between the assumed and observed growth rate) for 
each year of each variant of each projection, calculated using the formula 
given in Equation 2, following Grummer-Strawn and Espenshade (1991): 
 r r r
t t
P t P
error proj actual
proj actual
= − =
−
⋅1
1 0
1ln
( ) (t
P t P t
proj actual
0
0 1
)
( ) ( )⋅





  (2)
In some cases in which the years do not match exactly, multiple years for 
Britain are compared on a single graph. For projections that include a cen-
tral variant, only the central variant is shown. For years in which there is 
no central French variant, the low and high variants are shown instead. In 
addition, for the French projections for 1963 and 1970, variants both with 
and without migration are shown. Here negative values indicate under-
prediction of growth (where actual growth rates exceeded projected growth 
rates) and positive values indicate over-prediction. The value zero represents 
exact accuracy.
Figure 3 reveals a pattern of three distinct periods in these projections. In 
the first period, the early 1950s, projections in both countries under-predict 
population growth. Much of this error was caused by under-prediction of 
births: the postwar baby boom was not anticipated in these projections, which 
instead assumed a return to the lower birthrates of the early 1940s. The 1950s 
graph also shows that British projections were closer to correct—they under-
predicted by less—than the French central projection during this period. 
The 1950s graph in the Appendix shows, however, that this is not because 
the projected British growth rates were higher than the French. Rather, the 
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French projected higher growth rates for this period, but because their actual 
growth rates were higher than the British rates, their errors were of greater 
magnitude. In the second period (1963–1970), projections for both countries 
over-predict total population, partly because of a failure to anticipate the 
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FIGURE 3   Error in projected growth rates for Britain and France, 
projections published 1950–1991
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end of the baby boom. Here the patterns of errors are very similar for both 
the British projections and the French variants that include migration: they 
increasingly over-predict population growth over time. The third period, 
starting in 1975, represents a time of great uncertainty about future trends in 
fertility. Fertility rates and birthrates had been falling since the early 1960s, 
and several paths seemed possible: fertility might rise again to earlier levels, it 
might continue to fall, or it might remain stable at its current level. Here the 
projections in both countries are closer to accurately predicting total popula-
tion. The British projections and the high variants of the French projections 
are much closer to accuracy, while the low French variants tend to under-
predict population growth.
The effect of fertility assumptions on projections
As noted above, in this context fertility rates are the most important element 
of population projections for determining the long-term trend of population 
size. Comparing predicted trajectories of fertility levels (measured by the TFR) 
to the observed trajectory of fertility allows better understanding of how fer-
tility assumptions contribute to errors in projections of total population size. 
Again, since British fertility assumptions for the earlier projections were based 
on the number of annual births, rather than the TFR, the analysis starts in 
1970. Figure 4 shows the error in projected TFR (the difference between the 
assumed and observed TFR) by year; again, negative values indicate under-
prediction of TFR, and positive values represent over-prediction. As this figure 
shows, the TFR was often over-predicted, sometimes by a substantial amount. 
In the 1970 projections, the TFR assumptions miss the mark by approximately 
0.8 births. This is a large error, since the observed TFR during this period 
ranged between 2 and 3. The British projections, as well as the French high 
variants, consistently relied on assumptions about fertility that were above 
actual rates. The French low variants, on the other hand, were often higher 
than actual fertility rates in the earlier part of the projected period, but then 
under-predicted fertility rates in the later years of the projected period. These 
graphs highlight an important feature of the errors in projected growth rates 
shown in Figure 3: in 1975 and 1985, even projections that over-predicted 
fertility levels by a large amount produced only minor over-prediction of total 
population growth. In these cases, over-prediction of fertility was balanced by 
under-prediction of migration, as well as (to a lesser extent) over-prediction 
of mortality.
Nevertheless, most of the observed cross-national difference between 
projections was in fact due to differences in fertility assumptions. An addi-
tional analysis provides an example showing to what extent differences in 
the British and French projections are the result of differences in assump-
tions about fertility rather than about mortality or migration. This analysis 
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uses alternate fertility assumptions for the 1975 British projection, using the 
low and high variants of the French fertility assumptions for 1975 as com-
parisons.11 While the British projection and the French high variant both 
assumed that the TFR would rise to a constant value of 2.1, the French low 
variant assumed that the TFR would decrease very slightly to reach a constant 
below-replacement value of 1.8. 
This analysis used single-year age groups by sex and applied the pub-
lished five-year mortality rates to the surrounding five-year age intervals 
(e.g., the mortality rate for 27-year-olds was used for ages 25–29). Future 
mortality rates were calculated using the published assumptions for annual 
improvement in mortality rates by age. For the mortality rates of one-year-
olds, which were not published and are rather different from the rates at 
older ages, the rates from the actual period lifetable from 1975 (ONS 2011) 
were used, since the rates for infant mortality and two-year-old mortality 
closely matched the published assumptions for those ages. The mortality rate 
assumed for the oldest age category, ages 85 and over, was calculated using 
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FIGURE 4   Error in projected total fertility rate for Britain and France, 
projections published 1970–1991
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the published results of the British projections and an assumption of no mi-
gration at those ages, then working backward to find the rate used to make 
the projections for that age.
The formulas used to calculate projected population size are taken from 
the published projections (OPCS 1977: 3–4). For each sex, the size of the 
population P for age x was calculated using Equation 3 below, for mortality 
rates q: 
 n x n x n xP P q= ⋅ −− − −1 1 11( )  (3)
The number of births in year n was calculated with Equation 4, using 
n
P
x
F, the 
number of women of age x in year n, and ASFR
x
, the age-specific fertility rate 
for women age x, where x ranges from 15 to 44: 
 B P P ASFR
x n x
F
n x
F
x
= +
=
−
∑ 121544 1( )  (4)
After births across all ages of women were summed, the published infant 
mortality rate was applied as in Equation 3 to derive the number of surviving 
children age less than one year. The normal sex ratio of 1.06 males to 1 female 
was then applied to find the size of this age group by sex.
The British projections were replicated using the age-specific fertility 
rates from the published projection (because fertility rates were given by 
calendar year, the mean of two calendar-year rates was taken to obtain each 
mid-year rate). For the first low-fertility British variant, fertility assump-
tions were changed so that fertility was projected to increase at the pace of, 
and with the age distribution assumed in, the official British projections, but 
would stop increasing at a TFR of 1.8, rather than at a TFR of 2.1. The second 
low-fertility British variant again assumed that fertility would stop increasing 
when TFR reached 1.8, but used the age distribution and pace of increase of 
fertility from the low variant of the French projection for 1975. The error in 
the growth rate was then calculated for these alternate British projections and 
compared to the errors for the original British projection and both variants of 
the French projection for 1975.
The results of the comparisons of alternate low-fertility British projec-
tions for 1975 are shown in Figure 5. The two dashed lines, representing the 
British projections recalculated for a TFR of 1.8, decline more steeply than 
the official British projection, and by the late 1990s are nearly the same as 
the French low variant. This analysis shows that in both alternate scenarios 
in which the TFR is assumed to reach equilibrium at 1.8, the growth-rate er-
rors that result are virtually identical to the French low-variant errors by the 
end of the projection period. Thus it is indeed different assumptions about 
fertility that are driving the observed cross-national difference in the 1975 
projections: if the same fertility assumptions had been used in both countries, 
their projections would have been quite similar. These analyses of population 
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projections demonstrate how the different assumptions made about future 
fertility in France and Great Britain resulted in concrete and quantifiable dif-
ferences in the projections made in the two countries.
These results of quantitative analyses of population projections show 
that cross-national differences in the number of variants and fertility as-
sumptions had important implications for the projections produced in the 
two countries. To better understand the sources of the observed differences 
in projections, I now turn to the contexts in which these projections were 
produced. Starting with the different demographic histories of France and 
Great Britain, the following sections discuss mechanisms that shaped cross-
national differences in population projections. 
The weight of history: Concerns about 
population before World War II
The demographic histories of Great Britain and France are essential to un-
derstanding later views of population in these countries. In Britain, Mal-
thus’s fears of unchecked population growth were highly influential. Before 
Malthusian thought dominated the field of British political economy at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, a number of British authors debated 
whether population decline presented a threat to British society (Glass 1973). 
By the late nineteenth century, however, improved systems for collecting 
information about births and deaths showed that in Britain, as in much of 
Western Europe, the population had increased greatly during that century. 
FIGURE 5   Error in projected growth rates for 1975, alternate 
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Total population in England and Wales nearly doubled from about 18 million 
in 1851 to over 32 million in 1901 (Mitchell 1988: 9). 
In contrast, the population of France was about 36.5 million in 1851 
(about twice that of England and Wales), but grew only to about 40.5 mil-
lion in 1901 (INSEE 2014b). The French census of 1872 reported that the 
population had actually decreased since the previous census in 1866 (Spen-
gler 1938: 23). Together with the French defeat in the Franco–Prussian war 
in 1870, this decrease in population led to widely discussed fears that the 
French nation itself was in decline, as the French population was becoming 
outnumbered by its rivals. This line of thought provoked an impressive array 
of French intellectuals to propose theories of fertility decline and popula-
tion decline, often treating them as symptoms of general decay in society 
(Spengler 1938, ch. 6). This history of nineteenth-century fertility decline 
exacerbated the effects of France’s high mortality and its steep drop in fer-
tility during World War I, as well as public concerns about those effects, as 
described in Spengler’s contemporaneous account of French fertility decline 
(Spengler 1938, ch. 6), as well as in more recent histories (e.g., Teitelbaum 
and Winter 1985, ch. 2). 
France’s unique position in initiating fertility decline in Europe, along 
with the accompanying stalling of its population growth in the nineteenth 
century, is sometimes invoked by demographers today as sufficient explana-
tion of French concerns over low fertility, in a conventional wisdom that sees 
French pronatalism as a form of national exceptionalism. This history un-
doubtedly had a lasting influence on views of population in France, and could 
well have influenced events after World War II. However, this explanation is 
incomplete as a historical account: certainly, events of the nineteenth century 
affected events of later years, but they cannot provide a sufficient explana-
tion for those later events without some understanding of the mechanisms by 
which their influence operated many decades later. In the following section, 
I use historical sources to explore how institutional configurations related to 
population projections may have served as such mechanisms.
Supporting the need for such analysis, further evidence that nineteenth-
century demographic differences did not lead directly to post–World War II 
differences is found in the fact that, despite these countries’ different histo-
ries, public debates over population between the two world wars reveal a 
period of shared concern over low fertility and population decline (Pedersen 
1993). These debates make postwar divergence in interpretations of fertility 
rates even more surprising. As noted above, French concerns over low fer-
tility before World War II are well documented. Discussions of the dangers 
of low fertility in interwar Britain are less often remembered, despite some 
compelling accounts by historians (Lewis 1980; Soloway 1990). Even after 
the start of the baby boom in the 1940s, concerns over birthrates and fertility 
decline did not simply disappear at the end of World War II. Concern over 
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population was so strong in both countries that a British Royal Commission 
on Population was appointed in 1944, and a French High Consultative Com-
mittee on Population and the Family in 1945, to examine the issue and make 
recommendations for state action on the matter. Furthermore, in a speech at 
the end of the war, Charles de Gaulle famously declared that France needed 
“twelve million beautiful babies” over the next ten years (Weiner 2001: 
23). Similarly, in a speech given near the end of the war, Winston Churchill 
proclaimed, “One of the most somber anxieties which beset those who look 
thirty or forty or fifty years ahead … is a dwindling birth rate … our people 
must be encouraged by every means to have larger families” (“Mr. Churchill 
on Post-War Policy” 1943: 6).
As these events indicate, at the end of World War II it was far from obvi-
ous that fear of population decline would remain an issue of public concern 
in France, but not in Great Britain, for the rest of the century. The first part 
of this study has shown that national population projections after World War 
II presented very different conceptions of the demographic future of each 
country, with French projections presenting a possible future of long-term 
population decline, while British projections did not support such an inter-
pretation. In the following section, I will argue that these different postwar 
projections were influenced by the different demographic histories of France 
and Great Britain. Different institutional arrangements led different kinds of 
demographic experts to produce official projections in each country, influ-
encing the projections themselves and supporting continued attention to low 
fertility in France, but not in Britain.12
Institutional configurations and  
the production of projections
French demographers and family associations
At the end of World War II, new institutions proliferated in both France and 
Great Britain. Powerful and far-reaching state organizations that shaped 
the rest of the century were created, including the British National Health 
Service, the French Social Security program, and many others (Nord 2010; 
Glennerster 2000, ch. 1 and 3). This institution-building period benefited 
French academic demographers, but not their British counterparts. In 
France, new state research organizations employed demographic and other 
academic experts. These institutes, founded at the beginning of the Fourth 
Republic, include the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED— 
Institut  national d’études démographiques) and the National Institute of Statistics 
and Economic Studies (INSEE—Institut national de la statistique et des études 
économiques). These organizations provided demographers with a new base 
of institutional support. The institutions themselves drew heavily on the 
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material and organizational structures of research institutes founded and 
sponsored by the Vichy regime: when the French demographer Alfred Sauvy 
became director of INED, he brought to the new organization personnel and 
computational equipment of the Vichy-era Fondation Carrel, where he had 
worked during the war (Nord 2010; Rosental 2003). Historical accounts have 
shown that the groundwork for these and other postwar measures to address 
demographic issues grew out of prewar concerns over demographic decline 
(Nord 2010; Reggiani 1996). 
These research institutes, supported by the state and headed by profes-
sional researchers, gave French demographers greater autonomy and a larger 
public stage on which to promote their ideas. In addition, the French High 
Committee on Population, a permanent government council, provided more 
opportunities for advocacy and publicity on matters relating to population. 
Sauvy, as the first director of INED, was able to pursue his agenda for demo-
graphic research with greater autonomy than he had enjoyed during the in-
terwar and Vichy periods (Rosental 2003, ch. 6). The agenda these demogra-
phers pursued was generally pronatalist. The most prominent demographers 
of this era—Adolphe Landry, Alfred Sauvy, Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, and Gérard 
Calot—were all supporters of pronatalist policies (Le Bras 1991). Sauvy, for 
example, used his column in Le Monde to advocate for higher birthrates even 
at the peak of the French baby boom (e.g., Sauvy 1965). 
In fact, during the immediate postwar years, academic demographers 
engaged in a power struggle with representatives of French family associa-
tions, civic organizations that had formed a strong social movement to ad-
vocate for the interests of families during the interwar period. The rift came 
after they had joined in common cause in interwar struggles for a compre-
hensive family policy, when the family associations wielded great influence 
(Pedersen 1993). Their disagreements are detailed in Rosental’s account of 
the founding and early history of INED, which describes how the increas-
ing complexity of the formal models used to study fertility in the research 
institutes allowed demographic experts to make arguments that could not be 
countered effectively by the family associations (Rosental 2003). Although 
the most prominent leader of the family associations, Fernand Boverat, au-
thored a chapter on the consequences of population decline in a popular text 
on the French demographic situation in the interwar period (Huber, Bunle, 
and Boverat 1937), after the war he found himself out of his depth, admit-
ting to the Secretary of the French High Committee on Population that the 
work of the INED researchers was beyond him: “Their graphs which seem 
very simple to them are often very difficult to understand for non-initiates” 
(cited in Rosental 2003: 164).
As Rosental recounts, Boverat’s exclusion and relative loss of stature 
were made painfully clear in a 1954 dispute over population projections 
for a demographic report that the government requested from INED (Haut 
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Comité de la Population 1955). Sauvy favored one set of assumptions to 
be used in making the projections; Boverat thought Sauvy’s assumptions 
understated the danger of future population decline and would harm public 
support for family policies. In the end, despite a series of letters from Boverat 
expressing his concerns in increasingly urgent terms, Sauvy’s projections 
remained in the report and Boverat resigned from the project, giving Sauvy 
a clear victory (Rosental 2003: 165). Although both men were pronatalists, 
Sauvy’s belief that recent increases in birthrates should be reflected in the 
new projections conflicted in this case with Boverat’s sole focus on advo-
cacy: Boverat did not argue that Sauvy’s projections were inaccurate, but 
that they would be politically damaging. As Rosental points out, it was 
Sauvy’s position at INED that allowed him to prevail in the conflict with 
Boverat. More generally, this position allowed Sauvy to set the terms of his 
research, such as the assumptions used to make population projections, un-
like in his work during the interwar period, when he was commissioned to 
produce projections following assumptions chosen by his funders, including 
Boverat’s organization (Rosental 2003: 165).
Professional demographic researchers at INED and INSEE thus benefited 
from the institutional reconfiguration of the postwar period. As a result of 
their institutional position and resources, demographers at state research 
institutes in France were able to make prominent contributions to public 
debates over fertility trends and population growth. Projections were made 
by researchers at INSEE and INED: INSEE published all of the French projec-
tions made after 1950 (INED published the 1950 projections), but there was a 
great deal of overlap between the two organizations. Sauvy was a member of 
INSEE, even while he was director of INED, and the authors of the INSEE pro-
jections included two future directors of INED, Bourgeois-Pichat and Calot.
British demographers and government actuaries
British demographers, many of whom had argued that fertility declines war-
ranted public concern and state intervention in interwar Britain, were left 
with a much weaker institutional position after World War II, compared to 
their French counterparts. Their institutional position had also been precari-
ous before the war: between the world wars, no university position in de-
mography existed until 1938, when the Rockefeller Foundation in the United 
States funded a readership in demography at the London School of Econom-
ics (Grebenik 1991: 8). Some demographers in the interwar period received 
support from the Population Investigation Committee (PIC), founded as part 
of an attempt by the Eugenics Society (which was also concerned about the 
dangers of low fertility, particularly among the middle and upper classes) to 
gain legitimacy through an emphasis on science (Soloway 1990: 247–49). Its 
beneficiaries included the leading British demographer of the postwar period, 
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David Glass, whose position as research secretary with the PIC allowed him 
to develop his doctoral dissertation into the large volume Population: Policies 
and Movements in Europe, published in 1940 (Langford 1988: 5, 9). 
At the end of World War II, however, no stable institutional structures 
for demographic research were created in Britain, despite recommendations 
from the British Royal Commission on Population that a state research insti-
tute for the study of demography be founded (Royal Commission on Popula-
tion 1949: 25). The Royal Commission itself disbanded when it completed its 
investigation in 1949. The postwar decline of the eugenics movement (Solo-
way 1990: ch. 14) reduced another source of support for British academic 
demographers, who were left with, at best, positions scattered across depart-
ments and disciplines at various universities. Thus British demographers 
lacked both the autonomy to allocate funds for research to projects of their 
choosing and an institutional platform to provide the kind of prominence in 
the public sphere that French demographers attained. 
With no state institute for the study of demography, responsibility for 
producing official British national population projections stayed with govern-
ment officials whose training and disciplinary identity was actuarial, rather 
than demographic. Projections were produced first at the General Register 
Office (GRO), and after 1954 at the Government Actuary’s Department 
(GAD) “in consultation with” the GRO (Registrar General’s Statistical Review 
1957). The civil servants in these government offices had earlier had several 
contentious exchanges with prominent British demographers over meth-
odological disagreements regarding population projections (Current Trend 
1942; Kuczynski 1942; Glass 1944). These disagreements over methods had 
a substantive component as well: the GRO officials argued that concern over 
British fertility decline was exaggerated and unwarranted, while academic 
demographers, among the leading advocates of concern over low fertility 
during the interwar period, argued that it was a serious problem. Clashes be-
tween these two professional groups continued throughout the 1940s, with 
the GRO’s representatives on the Royal Commission on Population declining 
to endorse its final report in 1949.
The GRO’s early postwar projections reflect the disciplinary distance 
between the makers of British projections and academic demographers. 
As late as 1957, projections did not yet use the cohort component method, 
but rather projected constant numbers of annual births (Registrar General’s 
Statistical Review 1957), despite the fact that cohort component analysis had 
become the international standard for projection by that time (Gans 1999) 
and the British Royal Commission on Population had introduced the method 
to British demographers and government officials alike through the work of 
its Statistics Committee in the 1940s (Grebenik 1991). Although the govern-
ment offices employed workers with statistical training, department leader-
ship was recruited from elites from the classical educational system, lacking 
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specialized technical training (Fourcade 2009: 42), a problem that was not 
addressed until the 1960s (Benjamin 1982: 222). 
The institutional configurations of postwar France and Great Britain 
led to very different outcomes in terms of who made the official national 
population projections during the crucial early postwar years, when it was 
unclear whether recent increases in fertility rates were a short-term change 
(similar to the short-lived increase in fertility following World War I) or part 
of a longer-term trend. In France, academic demographers who had long 
promoted concern about low fertility made the projections, enabled by their 
position in state research institutes. In Great Britain, civil servants with sta-
tistical, not demographic, training, who had long argued that concern over 
low fertility was exaggerated, made projections while academic demographers 
were sidelined.
Conclusion
This study has shown how population projections, a key mechanism for the 
production and dissemination of demographic knowledge, differed in France 
and Great Britain in the fifty years following World War II. I used official na-
tional population projections to examine how very different interpretations of 
fertility trends were maintained in France and Great Britain throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, despite their similar trends in observed 
fertility rates during this period. Two important cross-national differences in 
the production of projections were identified. One is the publication of single-
variant projections in Britain, which facilitated interpretation of the British 
projections as predictions of the most likely future and made them seem more 
certain, versus the publication of multiple variants for each projection in 
France, which emphasized the contingency of the French population projec-
tions and uncertainty about the demographic future of France. The second 
cross-national difference identified is the use of different fertility assump-
tions, which in France included a variant with long-term below-replacement 
fertility, and in Great Britain assumed that fertility would remain at or near 
replacement level in the long term. 
An analysis of projections of total population showed that, although the 
technical methods used to make them were quite similar, these cross-national 
differences in fertility assumptions led to important differences in the projec-
tions of total population. British projections and the high variants of French 
projections, which assumed fertility levels at or near replacement, projected 
low to moderate growth throughout the period in question. The French low 
variants, which assumed continuing below-replacement fertility, by 1975 
projected that total population would begin to decline during the projected 
period. Additional analyses showed that, as expected, differences in fertility 
assumptions account for nearly all of the cross-national differences in long-
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term outcomes in these projections. The possibility of a demographic future 
of population decline was articulated and visually represented in the French 
projections, but was not admitted in the British projections. The differing 
projections produced in these two countries thus created opportunities for 
the use of official state projections to justify concern over population decline 
in France, but not in Britain. 
I examined two mechanisms that contributed to the observed cross-
national differences in population projections: demographic history and 
institutional configurations. Longstanding French concerns over low fertility 
and population decline, which led to a pronatalist consensus across the po-
litical spectrum, facilitated the founding of research institutes in the postwar 
period that increased the influence of academic demographers. Demographers 
concerned with low fertility produced official projections at these research 
institutes in postwar France, while their British counterparts did not hold in-
stitutional positions that would allow them to perform that function. British 
population projections were instead produced by government actuaries with 
different disciplinary and intellectual commitments. 
National population projections created divergent representations of 
the two countries’ demographic futures: an ever-present threat of decline in 
France, and a reassuring image of stability in Britain. Population projections 
in France and Great Britain thus contributed to differing interpretations of 
population and fertility trends, as concern over low fertility continued to be 
a notable feature of expert and public discussion in France, but not in Great 
Britain.
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Appendix
Projected growth rates for Britain and France,  
projections published 1950–91
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1 Alfred Sauvy’s projections for France 
are credited by some French demographers 
with changing policy: “The first demographic 
projections were made in France by Alfred 
Sauvy in 1928. They … contributed … to the 
adoption of the Code de la Famille”—the legisla-
tion of 1939 that served as the blueprint for 
French family policy in the postwar period 
(Calot et al. 1970: 5). All translations from 
French sources are the author’s own.
2 As noted by Romaniuc, the salience 
of uncertainty for projections grew with the 
rise of the cohort component method: earlier 
methods, which sought to extrapolate trends 
in total population size using mathematical 
formulas, were often thought of as searches 
for a “law” of population growth, and thus 
were not subject to concerns about uncer-
tainty. The cohort component method, on 
the contrary, relies on explicit assumptions 
about each of the factors that contribute to 
total population size (fertility, mortality, and 
migration), and, with its use, “uncertainty 
as an inherent feature of the future entered 
the consciousness of forecasters” (Romaniuc 
2003: 23). 
3 For example, when Enid Charles pub-
lished projections that included a scenario 
in which the English population declined to 
below 20 million by the year 2000, she clearly 
stated that her projections represented pos-
sible scenarios, not predictions (1938: 75). 
However, when her work was cited in public 
and political debates, it was often presented 
as a forecast of what would happen to the fu-
ture population, unless something were done 
(Grebenik 1991: 8).
4 For simplicity I refer to Great Britain or 
Britain throughout rather than to the United 
Kingdom as the country or to England and 
Wales as the relevant statistical unit.
5 Although problems with period TFR 
as a summary measure of fertility are well 
known to demographers, it was the fertility 
indicator most widely used by demographers 
and policymakers during most of the period 
under study.
6 In low-mortality populations like 
those of twentieth-century Western Europe, 
assumptions about fertility are especially 
important for projections, since mortality, 
particularly at childbearing ages, is relatively 
low under all assumptions.
7 Projections for 1968 also exist, but are 
not included here since they are very similar 
to the 1970 projections. The 1970 projections 
retain the assumptions of 1968 and merely 
adjust the size of the initial population. The 
1968 version does not include variants with 
migration, since migration projections were 
not yet available.
8 In later French projections, separate 
variants without migration are not published, 
but projected migration is much lower: while 
projected net migration varied from 125,000 
to 210,000 annually in the 1963 and 1970 
projections, it was assumed to be zero in the 
1975 and 1985 projections, and only 50,000 
annually in the 1990 projections.
9 Assumed TFR is shown for England 
only, as aggregated figures for England and 
Wales are available only for 1971. Compari-
son of the observed TFR for England versus 
England and Wales (not shown) indicates, 
however, that English TFR is quite similar 
to aggregate TFR, since the population of 
England is so much larger than that of Wales.
10 It is also noteworthy that, when the 
British did publish multiple variants, as in 
the 1989 projections, the low-variant TFR 
stabilizes at 1.8 (well above the French 1990 
low variant of 1.5), and the high variant is 
2.2, above the French 1990 high variant of 2.1 
(OPCS 1991; Dinh 1995).
11 Replication with migration is not 
possible, because details of the assumed age 
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